You don’t improve morale by increasing pay …
August 12, 2025
Looking back at 2025 … and what’s in store for 2026
1 January 2026
Happy New Year.
Before commencing with any substantive discussion, I will offer a bit of public introspection.
This Blog has been inactive since mid-August 2025. Perhaps more accurately: I have not written any blog posts since mid-August. I had a busy autumn, which has led into a busy winter. And I needed a break. But developments in military law and military justice did not cease. There are several subjects that merit discussion. And, believe me, the need to discuss those developments gnawed at me, competing with other priorities for my attention. Anyone who has experienced an ever-growing “to do list” has felt the way that I have felt over the past several weeks.
The role of advocate can be tiring, particularly when it overlaps with academic pursuits and a self-imposed task of offering public commentary on a as broad a subject as military law. The risk of ‘burn out’ is ever-present. So … I took some time off from my blog to focus on other pursuits, including maintaining mental well-being.
I began this Blog seven years ago to achieve certain objectives, most of which focus on educating people on military law, particularly the subjects that encompass ‘military justice’ (in its broadest definition) and the administration of the affairs of the Canadian Forces (CF). I wanted the blog to be a resource for members of the CF, who are often at a disadvantage when faced by the various processes that can be employed by the chain of command. I also hoped that CF personnel in leadership positions would read it, and, perhaps, gain a greater appreciation for the nature of the powers that they wield and the duties and functions that they perform. It is possible that the contents of this blog might even give CF legal advisors some pause regarding some of the problematic positions that the Office of the Judge Advocate General (OJAG) or the chain of command take from time to time.
This blog might even serve to educate the broader Canadian public. It can do so in at least a couple of different ways. First, it can serve to educate journalists in national and regional news media regarding some of the military topics that they cover. After all, the Canadian public will purportedly turn to the news media to educate them on current events, and an ill-informed news media leads to an ill-informed public. Arguably, many people these days obtain their “news” from social media, and that can be a problematic source. Most of us are aware that social media algorithms often drive confirmation bias and can be rife with misinformation and disinformation. So, this blog – which is publicly available – can provide information directly to the Canadian public. That is one of the reasons why I regularly post this blog on my own social media. Indeed, providing access to this blog is one of the principal reasons why I have social media accounts.
I am not so delusional as to believe that my blog is widely read by Canadians, or even widely read by members of the Canadian military and veteran communities. However, I do know that it is read by some Canadians, by some CF personnel, and even by some journalists. So, I endeavour to be as thorough, as accurate, and as informative as possible. That’s one of the reasons why many of my blogs tend to be lengthy. And I make no apologies for the length of my blog posts. (OK … I apologize a little bit for the self-indulgent verbosity that sometimes arises. But I do so, in part, to keep my blog posts from becoming too dry. At least, that is what I tell myself. I may or may not succeed in that endeavour.)
Nevertheless, I took a break for a little over a third of 2025. That is a not-insignificant amount of time for a blog that purports to cover ‘current events’ to go fallow. Consequently, I felt that I should offer a bit of an explanation for what may have appeared to be silence on my part, and to offer a segue as I resume this endeavour.
The period around Christmas and the end of the calendar year (and start of a new year) offers such an opportunity. After all, there is a multitude of year-end and new year lists and offerings on social media, streaming services, and more traditional forms of media such as television and radio. It would be logical to resume my blog activities with similar lists or retrospection.
I had considered different options to do so. One possibility was to prepare a dozen blog posts to present over the “12 Days of Christmas”: the 12 Blogs of Christmas. Maybe next year. Another option would have been to present a retrospective of 2025 over the course of two or three blogs, followed by a discussion of what we can anticipate in 2026 in, again, two or three blogs.
Frankly, that would have occupied a great deal of my time in December. I was very busy during the first half of the month and, by the time the 20th rolled around, I needed a break. And I needed to re-evaluate what I wish to accomplish with this blog. I still wish to educate people and influence decision-makers. I still wish to offer a voice on important subjects that affect the Canadian military and veteran community. And I wish to do so in a structured and predictable way.
So, call it a ‘New Year’s resolution’, or call it a tweak to this blog – I will endeavour to provide an informative discussion every week on a particular subject. There may still need to be a requirement for timely reflection on a particular matter when it arises; however, my goal, starting in 2026, is to offer commentary every week on a particular subject of importance in the governance and administration of the affairs of the CF. Doing so on a more regular basis may also assist me in shortening the length of my blog posts.
But what about 2025?
There remain several noteworthy matters that arose in 2025, but which I have not discussed in this blog. And I feel like I would be giving 2025 short shrift if I failed to discuss some of the more significant of those matters, particularly as some of them will impact 2026 (and beyond). And I should at least identify those matters here. And my goal in the days to come will be to revisit some of the more significant matters in greater detail.
Court Martial Appeal Court of Canada
The Court Martial Appeal Court of Canada (CMAC) was active in 2025, though not as active in previous years. The CMAC handed down only three judgments or orders in 2025:
R v Calderon concerned a motion by the appellant (the Crown) for leave to file a reply memorandum in an appeal. Although opposed by the respondent (Corporal Calderon), the Chief Justice of the CMAC granted the motion. The Appeal was heard 26 September 2025, and the Court reserved judgment.
R v Houde was an appeal by Master-Corporal (MCpl) Houde regarding the finding of guilt on two counts of sexual assault.[1] MCpl Houde initially faced four charges: sexual assault causing bodily harm (charge #1); sexual assault (charges #2 and #3); and, distribution of an intimate image without consent (charge #4). All four charges, arising under the Criminal Code, were charged pursuant to s 130 of the National Defence Act (NDA)[2]. The fourth charge was withdrawn by the military prosecutor. MCpl Houde was acquitted of charge #1 and found guilty of charges #2 and #3. The complainant for all charges was MCpl Houde’s former intimate partner. MCpl Houde was sentenced to imprisonment for two years less a day.
The grounds for the appeal upon which the Court focused were: (a) whether the military judge provided instructions that were contrary to the principles set out inR v W(D), [1991] 1 SCR 742; and, (b) whether the military judge made inappropriate comments regarding the evidence before the court and panel, in particular, photographic evidence presented by the defence during the court martial.
In a judgment penned by Cournoyer JA, the Court held that the military judge’s charge (i.e., instructions) to the Panel was highly problematic and unfair. This necessitated retrial on both the second and third charges that MCpl Houde faced. The Court also held that the instructions regarding the photographic evidence was also unfair. Although the charge regarding the photographic evidence related solely to the third charge, the more general defects in the military judge’s instructions to the Panel obliged the court to quash the findings of guilt for both charges and to order a retrial.
There may be merit in providing a more detailed examination of R v Houde in the coming weeks. However, it is the third decision from the CMAC that likely warrants the greatest attention.
R v Allison concerned the jurisdiction of the Code of Service Discipline over a civilian – specifically, a spouse of a CF member posted to an “OUTCAN” (outside Canada) position located in Belgium. Mr. Allison was charged with impaired operation of a motor vehicle (“operating a conveyance while impaired) contrary to paragraph 320.14(1)(a) of the Criminal Code and charged pursuant to s 130 of the NDA.
At a time when CF decision-makers are expressly referring certain allegations against CF personnel to the civilian criminal justice system, notwithstanding that there is jurisdiction under the Code of Service Discipline, the insistence on prosecuting a civilian under the Code of Service Discipline raises pertinent legal and policy issues. Although I briefly discussed this judgment in a post on the Global Military Justice Reform blog, the judgment merits further examination. I will do so in the coming days.
The judgment of the CMAC was unanimous. Therefore, if Mr. Allison wished to seek further appeal before the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC), he would first be required bring an Application for Leave to Appeal. The limitation period to file an Application for Leave to Appeal to the SCC is 60 days following the date of judgment from the CMAC. The calculation of this limitation period is suspended during the holiday period between 23 December 2025 and 3 January 2026. The CMAC handed down its judgment in R v Allison on 6 November 2025. Therefore, an Application would have to be filed by 19 January 2026. At present, there is no indication that an application has been filed with the SCC.
Aftermath of R v Edwards
2025 also saw the prosecution of several of the accused and allegations that were the subject of the appeal in R v Edwards, 2024 SCC 15. R v Edwards was the culmination of appeals from nine different courts martial and focused on whether military judges (and, therefore, courts martial) benefitted from sufficient independence that they constituted an independent and impartial tribunal.
I have commented previously on aspects of this judgment that were less-than-compelling:
Rory Fowler, “R v Edwards, 2024 SCC 15 … Meh …” (29 April 2024), online: Law Office of Rory G Fowler/Blog <https://roryfowlerlaw.com/r-v-edwards-2024-scc-15-meh/>
Afton David and Rory Fowler, “Independence of the Canadian Military Judiciary: Much to be Desired?” (November 2024), online: Canadian Global Affairs Institute <https://www.cgai.ca/independence_of_the_canadian_military_judiciary_much_to_be_desired>
Afton David and Rory Fowler, “R v Edwards and Independence of Canadian Military Judiciary”, (2025) 103:1 Can Bar Rev 153
However, as I am a barrister in private practice, and not an apex court, my views on the matter are not determinative.
Most of the accused were charged with what may be characterized as ‘sexual offences’ under the Criminal Code, which were incorporated into the military justice system as service offences by virtue of s 130 of the NDA. Many also faced additional charges for unique “service offences” arising under the NDA. Following the SCC judgment in R v Edwards, these matters were remitted back to court martial for trial.
Well, that’s not entirely accurate. Not all of these matters were remitted back to court martial. Following the SCC judgement in R v Edwards, the Director of Military Prosecutions (DMP) stayed over half of the anticipated prosecutions. A prosecutorial stay differs from a judicial stay, but the result is the same: the prosecutions do not proceed. These prosecutions were abandoned by DMP without much, if any, public explanation. And that type of silence is not uncommon. It certainly doesn’t do much to aid transparency. Of those that were pursued, some resulted in acquittal, and there were no convictions for any of the ‘sexual offences’. These prosecutions also merit a more detailed discussion, which I will offer in the coming days. For the time being, I offer the following summary:
- R v Corporal Christmas – Tried by Court Martial for three charges: charge #1: sexual assault (s. 271 Criminal Code) pursuant to s 130 of the NDA; charge #2: behaved in a disgraceful manner (s 93 NDA); and, charge #3: drunkenness (s 97 NDA). Found guilty only of charge #3. Sentenced to a fine of $500.00. [It is not clear from the Chief Military Judge website whether this was a trial by Standing or General Court Martial.]
- R v Lieutenant (N) Brown – Tried by General Court Martial for two charges: charge #1: sexual assault (s. 271 Criminal Code) pursuant to s 130 of the NDA; and, charge #2: forcible confinement (s. 279(2) Criminal Code) pursuant to s 130 of the NDA. Acquitted on both charges.
- R v Captain Iredale – Tried by General Court Martial for a total of six charges: charges #1, #2, and #3: sexual assault (s. 271 Criminal Code) pursuant to s 130 of the NDA; and charges #4, #5, and #6: conduct to the prejudice of good order and discipline (s 129 NDA). Found guilty of charges #4 and #6. Sentencing pending.
There was a fourth notable court martial during 2025 regarding charges for ‘sexual offences’: R v Corporal Daniel-Awong. Although this matter was not the subject of appeal in R v Edwards, it was one of a few select allegations that remained within the military justice system following the direction of the (then) Minister of National Defence, Anita Anand, to the Canadian Forces Provost Marshal (CFPM) and DMP to refer matters to the civilian criminal justice system.
Despite some notoriety about the charges, there is very little information available regarding Corporal Daniel-Awong’s processes (due, in part, to publication bans). Corporal Daniel-Awong was charged with multiple criminal offences (pursuant to s 130 of the NDA) including: sexual assault causing bodily harm, assault with a weapon, extortion, forcible confinement, and uttering threats. According to the Chief Military Judge’s website, this matter initially proceeded by General Court Martial, beginning 29 May 2023, and that proceeding was terminated on 4 June 2024. The reasons are not publicly available. A Standing Court Martial was convened in 2025 and commenced on 10 June 2025. The accused was acquitted of all charges on 7 October 2025. More information is not publicly available.
Federal Court
There were also a few matters of note before the Federal Court. Many actions and applications for judicial review brought by CF personnel before the Federal Court are unsuccessful. Some CF personnel bring actions or applications prior to exhausting all potential remedies under statutes like the NDA. When that occurs, the Attorney General of Canada (AGC) will invariably raise the doctrine of “adequate alternate remedy” and seek to strike such applications. The Attorney General of Canada is almost always successful with such motions to strike.
Almost.
Occasionally, the AGC fails to hide behind this broad doctrine. Sometimes the results of such motions are not published. In Kuseler v Canada (Attorney General), Docket T-2892-24, the AGC’s motion to strike was unsuccessful, with Associate Judge Moore handing down her Order and Reasons on 2 April 2025. That Application was eventually heard on 17 November 2025, with judgment reserved.
A.B. v Canada, 2025 FC 282 concerned a certification and approval of a “Final Settlement Agreement” of a class action by members and former members of the CF who suffered racial discrimination and/or racial harassment in connection with their military service since 1985. You may recall this matter as giving rise to the tearful apology by the current Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS), General Jennie Carignan. The Final Settlement Agreement arising from this class action included “… a personalized apology letter from the Chief of Defence Staff”. Presumably, the tears were optional.
Of course, that apology and settlement arose after a motion to strike was raised by the AGC in December 2017 and subsequently withdrawn in February 2018. That abortive motion to strike was based upon “… various grounds including: that there was no cause of action in negligence as the CAF does not own a duty of care to members; that there are CAF internal dispute resolution processes; that section 9 of the Crown Liability and Proceedings Act acts as a bar to the claim; and that section 92 of the Canadian Forces Members and Veterans Re-establishment Compensation Act acts as a pension bar.” (A.B. v Canada, paras 9 and 10)
A casual observer would likely conclude, in the wake of decisions and orders such as Heyder v Canada (Attorney General), 2019 FC 1477, Thomas v Canada (Attorney General), 2024 FC 655, and A.B. v Canada, that a CF member’s chances for successful litigation improve markedly if a matter is the subject of a class action and if there is sufficient news media coverage that the Crown will be inclined not to oppose such matters if it can achieve some political capital from the outcome.
Note that the outcome in A.B. v Canada can be contrasted with the failed application in Fowler v Canada (Attorney General), 2025 FC 815 (NB: no relation to the author of this Blog). And that distinction merits future examination.
Meanwhile, individual CF members who are victims of unfair, unreasonable, or intransigent statutory decision-making that does not lend itself to a class action must make do with costly and challenging litigation. But first, they must typically exhaust the CF grievance process, which is infamous for unreasonable delay, and which offers the CF chain of command at least one, if not two, ‘mulligans’ to try to rehabilitate problematic decision-making.
There are at least two problems that tend to arise when CF leadership pursue such rehabilitative efforts. First, there tends to be a focus – if not outright obsession – by subsequent decision-makers to uphold the initial decision, regardless of its merit. They are emboldened in doing so, in part, based upon the Federal Court of Appeal judgment in McBride v Canada (National Defence), 2012 FCA 181, which describes what may be characterized as the doctrine of de novo review.
In McBride, Pelletier JA (for the court) emphasized that the final authority (in that particular case, the CDS himself) considered the matter de novo and, thereby, made a fresh decision on the basis of the Applicant/grievor’s entire file, including submissions made at each level of review. Thus, any prior procedural defects that may have arisen in the impugned decision at first instance could be ‘cured’ through the de novo review. This was not a new concept in administrative law generally, or even in the administration of CF grievances. But McBride brought some focus on the principle and is consistently cited by the AGC when the issue arises on applications for judicial review.
The Code of Service Discipline was subject to judicial review in Wiome v Canada (Attorney General), 2025 FC 257. And I note that, when that judgment was handed down, there was some gnashing of teeth and wringing of hands by certain CF members and by one or two journalists. Well, not immediately – it took almost 2 weeks for someone to notice the judgment, and Chris Lambie, writing for the National Post and other PostMedia publications, offered a brief commentary, drawn principally from select portions of the judgment from Justice Fothergill.
To the best of my knowledge, this matter concerned the first time that the sanction (punishment or sentence by another name) of “reduction in rank” had been imposed at a summary hearing.
You’ll recall from previous commentary in this blog that a summary hearing strongly resembles its predecessor in the Code of Service Discipline – the summary trial – save that, now, a CF member does not have the right to elect trial by a court martial (an independent and impartial tribunal) and the burden of proof is reduced to the civil standard of ‘balance of probabilities’. The claim by the CF that this also decriminalizes summary justice is largely a hollow claim since summary trials, in which election for court martial was withheld, did not produce sentences that would have incurred criminal records.[3]
That aside, the reasons offered by the Officer Conducting the Summary Hearing (OCSH) for imposing “reduction in rank” on (then) Major Wiome were markedly deficient. To suggest that they lacked sufficient justification, intelligibility, and transparency would be an under-statement. In fact, the reasons, offered by a colonel acting as OCSH, failed to identify relevant aggravating factors, and mischaracterized mitigating factors. The OCSH failed even to mention, let alone apply, principles and objectives of sanctions. The ‘reasons’ were largely hollow jingoism. There was no explanation why any lesser sanction (and all other sanctions were lesser sanctions) would not have been sufficient to maintain discipline.
On review, the review authority, Brigadier-General (BGen) S.G. Graham, the (then) Commander 3rd Canadian Division, was so focused on upholding a problematic decision that lacked transparency, intelligibility, and justification, that he offered his own, distinct, and similarly problematic analysis.
Part of the problem, I suspect, is that senior officers in the CF are ‘spoiled’ by the opportunity to conduct de novo review in the CF grievance process. They are accustomed to having the opportunity to rehabilitate markedly problematic decisions at first instance through the ‘magic’ of de novo review. They believe that de novo review permits them to “wipe the slate clean”. It doesn’t matter if an initial decision was procedurally unfair, if it was unreasonable, or if the decision-maker failed to produce evidence that was necessary to uphold his (or her) decision. De novo review is the cure all!
Isn’t it?
The problem with this mind-set – not just for the review of summary hearings, but also for grievances – is that de novo review is not an absolute cure all. While it can correct prior procedural defects – provided that sufficient effort it put into actually correcting those defects – it does not magically make that which is unreasonable suddenly reasonable. There is potential for de novo review to introduce new evidence, which might then justify something that was not previously justified. However, the mere fact that a process offers an opportunity to reconsider a prior unfair, unreasonable, or otherwise problematic decision does not mean that de novo review will automatically correct fatal defects.
Moreover, review of a summary hearing is principally not de novo review. While “new evidence” introduced in a review of a summary hearing could be subject to de novo consideration by a review authority, the review authority is largely constrained by the factual record before the OCSH. The review authority has a limited discretion to accept new evidence – and I hasten to add that this is a very limited discretion. And, while the review authority is empowered to make new findings of fact, provided they are supported by the evidence before the OCSH or by new and relevant information that was unknown at the time of the summary hearing, review authorities are cautioned against making broad redeterminations of fact. After all, they did not have the benefit of hearing the totality of the evidence.
Returning to the review in Wiome, in the review authority’s attempt to rehabilitate the deficient reasons of the OCSH, the BGen Graham presented analysis that “… departed significantly from the OCSH’s written reasons and supplemental submissions.” In particular, the court held that “… [w]hile the OCSH found that Captain Wiome had not demonstrated remorse and maturity, the [review authority] accepted that Captain Wiome had repeatedly acknowledged his wrongdoing. Confusingly, the RA considered this to be an aggravating factor …”.
Justice Fothergill found that the review authority’s “… decision did not comply with the legislative and policy framework that prescribed the nature of the review he was required to undertake. The decision was internally inconsistent, and lacked the requisite degree of justification, intelligibility and transparency (Vavilov at para 100). It was therefore unreasonable.”
The review by BGen Graham was quashed and remitted back to a new review authority.[4]
Much of the teeth-gnashing in the wake of this decision focused on why the Applicant should have been punished. I saw comments on social media by a variety of current and former CF personnel, including senior officers, castigating the Applicant, notwithstanding that they likely did not even read the entire judgment and certainly did not have all the relevant facts before them.
And a common lacuna amidst all this hand-wringing was the utter absence of any acknowledgement or realization that a colonel and a brigadier-general demonstrated that, even with the benefit of advice from the OJAG, they could not perform their functions under the Code of Service Discipline fairly, reasonably, and in accordance with a relatively uncomplicated legislative and policy structure.
In the public commentary that I saw, no one seemed at all concerned about the failure of statutory decision-making, even when the CF was provided an institutional mulligan.
And I compare the reaction to the judgment in Wiome to the reaction to the announcement by the Military Police Complaints Commission (MPCC) on 9 December 2025 regarding its Public Interest Inquiry (PII) into the military police investigation of Major-General Dany Fortin.
In her Final Report, the MPCC Chairperson offered a relatively scathing critique of actions by the military police (and others) during that investigation. It wasn’t surprising. I have been offering similar criticism of the military police for some time now. And, while the MPCC report merits further analysis and commentary, the factor to which I wish to draw your attention is the reaction of the news media, public commentators, and members of the military and veteran community.
I would be hesitant to suggest that the response was universal, but there was certainly an overwhelmingly consistent sentiment that Dany Fortin was a victim of unreasonable and unfair statutory decision-making by a variety of people –not just military police and not just CF decision-makers. I, too, believe that Dany Fortin was a victim of unreasonable and unfair statutory decision-making.
But here’s the thing: so was Captain Wiome.
And, yes, I was counsel for Captain Wiome in his application for judicial review. And, undoubtedly, some of you – perhaps many of you – would be quick to proclaim: “Well, you’re biased, Fowler. You’re his lawyer!” And, certainly, I am not impartial in that regard. But I wouldn’t be the first lawyer to comment on a matter in which the lawyer was involved. And it would be a tad facile simply to disregard objective commentary based upon that ground alone. So, I ask that you examine the merit of the analysis that I present and have been presenting for some time regarding fairness and reasonableness in CF statutory decision-making.
A great many CF personnel are subjected to unfair and unreasonable decision-making. They are victims of impunity in the administration of the affairs of the CF. And unlike Dany Fortin, many do not benefit from significant favourable public sentiment. For many, their matters are never the subject of national news media coverage. And, while that may save them from having their reputation impugned on the national stage, they also do not benefit from the surge of support that can arise from notoriety of unfair and unreasonable decision-making. Many do not have the support structure available to a General Officer / Flag Officer (GOFO) with many years of service. They very likely do not have the financial wherewithal of a GOFO.
And I turn my attention back to the reactions to both the judgment in Wiome and the MPCC findings (which do not constitute a binding decision in the manner of a court’s judgment) regarding Dany Fortin, and the marked differences in those reactions in the military and veteran community. In some cases, the same person who was outraged that Captain Wiome was successful before the Federal Court was outraged by Dany Fortin’s treatment. And some of those expressing such sentiments were current or former senior officers. And that juxtaposition troubled me.
My concern did not arise from any bias on my part, but by the failure of such observers to realize that, objectively, we’re talking about the same type of deficiency. Captain Wiome was subject to unfair and unreasonable decision-making. So was Major-General Fortin. And Major General Fortin was permitted to defend himself before an independent and impartial court with the assistance of counsel. Captain Wiome was subject to an OCSH’s jurisdiction in a process in which CF decision-makers routinely (read: always) refuse to permit privately-retained counsel from participating.
And, if you are outraged at MGen Fortin’s treatment, but don’t care about how Captain Wiome was treated, then you haven’t really been paying attention, and you don’t truly understand the problem facing the CF.
An unreasonable decision is unreasonable regardless of whether you personally like someone. An unfair decision is unfair regardless of whether you believe the person deserves a particular outcome (and particularly if you are not apprised of all of the relevant facts and factors). If the CF is going to be governed in a manner consistent with the rule of law – and we are consistently told that it is – then fairness and reasonableness in decision-making are not factors that ought to be subject to arbitrary whim. These are not ‘optional’ principles. They are among the most important guideposts to the proper exercise of statutory duties, powers, and functions.
Bill C-11
Another significant development in 2025 was the introduction of Bill C-11. I was tempted to write “reintroduction”, since Bill C-11 is an almost verbatim version of what was Bill C-66, which was struck from Parliament’s Order Paper in February 2025 when Parliament was prorogued by the Prime Minister in January 2025.
Bill C-11, entitled the Military Justice System Modernization Act, seeks to do a variety of things. However, the aspects of this proposed legislation that are likely the most notable (or most discussed) are the provisions that would again remove ‘sexual offences’ from the jurisdiction of the Code of Service Discipline where such alleged misconduct purportedly arises in Canada. In fact, this legislation would go further than the circumstances that existed prior to the enactment of Bill C-25 in 1998. The list of excluded offences is much more comprehensive, and the legislation also purports to limit investigation of these offences by the military police. There is a caveat regarding the prohibition on investigation, and it is one that is ripe for abuse. In light of the criticism that can reasonably be leveled against the military police, anyone concerned about military justice should be concerned about the potential for abuse.
I am bemused by the title of Bill C-11, and not just because such purportedly ‘descriptive’ titles tend to veer toward jingoism. I am bemused in the same way that I am bemused when certain commentators have accused me of expressing antiquated views when I have criticized Bill C-11. And that is because the central (or, at least, most notorious) aspects of Bill C-11 won’t modernize military justice. Those provisions are actually regressive in nature. They are returning the Code of Service Discipline to its pre-Bill C-25 status. They promote an inconsistent theory of military justice. They suggest that the military justice system is suitable for the prosecution of many criminal offences, just not ‘sexual offences’. Most significantly, the legislation won’t actually improve capacity of CF leadership to address sexual misconduct.
The deficiencies in Bill C-11, and in the underlying rationales for the proposed ‘reforms’, are too significant to address here. They will require one or more blog posts dedicated to that specific subject, and it is a subject upon which I will expand in future blog posts.
Conclusion
There were some significant developments in military justice and the administration of the affairs of the CF in 2025, and many of those developments will influence what arises in 2026. The manner in which the CF addresses sexual misconduct, discrimination, racism, and extremist views will continue to be fodder for national news media and will continue to preoccupy CF leadership. Grievances, and the efforts (or lack thereof) of CF leadership to improve the efficiency and merit of determination of grievances, will continue to be a subject worthy of examination. And, while the advent of a new year is often a time for optimism, I have my reservations regarding whether the senior CF leadership have actually learned the lessons of the past several years regarding the importance of fairness and reasonableness in statutory decision-making.
Time will tell, and I will endeavour to provide regular and informed commentary on these matters throughout the coming year.
[1] As an aside, roughly concurrent with the General Court Martial (GCM) for MCpl C. Houde, there was also a Standing Court Martial for another MCpl C. Houde (R c MCpl Houde, 2022 CM 3006; R c MCpl Houde, 2023 CM 3011; and, R c MCpl Houde, 2024 CM 3003), in which the accused faced four counts of sexual assault. These were distinct accused and distinct matters.
[2] National Defence Act, RSC 1985, c N-5 [NDA].
[4] The new review authority would eventually be identified as Lieutenant-General M. Wright, Commander Canadian Army. He, too, focused principally on salvaging the problematic decision by the OCSH, and not in providing an objective, open-minded, review of the decision. This matter is once again the subject of an application for judicial review, which will be heard in 2026 (Federal Court Docket T-2268-25).
