Kabuki Discipline

24 June 2026

 

Yesterday, Murray Brewster, the widely respected Defence and Security reporter for the CBC, published a digital report regarding the “temporary” removal from command (and appointment) of the commanding officer (CO) and Regimental Sergeant-Major (RSM) of 3^rd Battalion, Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry (3 PPCLI):

Murray Brewster, “Canadian Army battalion commander, chief warrant officer removed amid investigation” (23 June 2026), online: CBC News <https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/military-discipline-troops-investigation-9.7246387>

 

Presumably, this decision was made by the Commander, 3^rd Canadian Division (3^rd Cdn Div).  And I doubt very much that this decision was made without consulting the Commander of the Canadian Army (CCA), Lieutenant-General (LGen) Mike Wright.

And those of you who have been paying attention will know that this is not the first “temporary” removal from command in recent memory, and that “temporary” seems to be given a very large and liberal interpretation by the CCA and his subordinate commanders.

But we haven’t been told much about the reasons for this decision, notwithstanding that it was a very public decision.  The identities of the CO and RSM were publicly acknowledged, notwithstanding that administrative measures (such as removal from command) are typically characterized as “personal information” and, therefore, not intended for public dissemination.

I have indicated on multiple occasions that the Canadian Forces (CF) leadership is increasingly using administrative measures for disciplinary purposes.  Many of the decision-makers will insist that the decisions are being made, and actions taken, for purely administrative purposes and that they are not punitive in nature.

And most people who have more than a few brain cells to rub together know that such protestations are poppycock.  If these were intended purely as administrative measures, they would not be publicised in such a notorious fashion (only to have public affairs spin first aiders – they really aren’t proficient enough to be called doctors – to clam up and not provide further details).

In fact, when General Jennie Carignan, the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS), appeared before the Senate Standing Committee on National Security, Defence and Veterans Affairs regarding Bill C-11 (the so-called Military Justice System Modernization Act) on 8 June 2026, she pretty much bragged that the CF was handling allegations of sexual misconduct made against “probationary” members of the CF through administrative mechanisms.  So, the notion that administrative measures are not being used for disciplinary purposes is a risible suggestion at this point.

And, as I warned the Senate Standing Committee that same day, after Bill C-11 becomes law, the CF will continue to use – and abuse – administrative measures for disciplinary purposes and will almost certainly increase the instances of such improper action.

And we will revisit in future Blog posts the issue of abusive use of administrative processes when so-called “probationary” CF members are accused of sexual misconduct (or other forms of misconduct) and are compulsorily jettisoned from the CF long before such allegations are proven in any meaningful way.

But for now, let’s focus on what we are being told, and what we are not being told, about the shake up at 3 PPCLI.

And we aren’t being told much.  Murray Brewster’s reporting offers limited information, but I doubt that this is because Mr. Brewster is withholding information.  It is much more likely that the CF isn’t offering much.  Just enough to damage the reputations of the two CF personnel involved.

And the gap in information left by the CF will inevitably be filled with speculation and rumour.  And anyone with access to social media is likely able to dig up some of these rumours.

And here is what the rumour mill has produced (and I must emphasize that this is not information that I am in a position to verify):

• The CO and RSM were allegedly photographed drinking an alcoholic beverage on a CF/DND bus following an exercise;
• The photographer in question was a “junior rank”, presumably a corporal. Alternatively, a corporal obtained a copy of one or more photographs;
• The corporal in possession of the photograph(s) shared, or otherwise disseminated, the photograph(s) with someone else. It could have been news media.  It could have been other CF personnel.  It remains uncertain.
• This, purportedly, prompted the removal from command. Sorry – the “temporary” removal from command.

 

I have also seen some commentary from either serving or former personnel lauding the corporal who shared the image(s) and who thus precipitated the disciplinary action veiled as “administrative measures”.  Let’s put a pin in that for now.  We’ll return to that sentiment.

Let’s start with the central theme of the current discussion.  And that can best be described as the ongoing (and increasing) abandonment of the proper use of the Code of Service Discipline by the CF leadership.  This is manifested in the increasing use of “administrative measures” for disciplinary purposes.  And this specific incident is an object example of that trend.

Bill C-77[1], which was enacted in 2019, but which was not brought fully into force until 2022, bifurcated the Code of Service Discipline.[2]  I contend that part of the impetus behind this significant legislative initiative was that the chain of command resented the fact that those charged with service offences could often elect trial by court martial.

The Application in Noonan v Canada (AG), 2023 FC 618 concerned improper decisions by a variety of CF senior officers (i.e., decision-makers) who improperly, unreasonably, and perhaps most importantly, unlawfully withheld election for court martial from accused charged with Code of Service Discipline offences (specifically s 129 of the National Defence Act).  Obviously, the matters that were the subject of that Application (technically, two Applications) arose before the Code of Service Discipline was bifurcated on 20 June 2022.

Rory Fowler “Noonan v AGC, 2023 FC 618 – An unsurprising result and its second-order implications” (5 May 2023), online: Law Office of Rory G Fowler/Blog <https://roryfowlerlaw.com/noonan-v-agc-2023-fc-618-an-unsurprising-result-and-its-second-order-implications/>

 

That trend – the improper withholding of the right to elect trial by court martial – appeared to have started (or, perhaps more accurately, increased) in 2019 after Bill C-77 was enacted.  As I allude above (and have explained in previous Blog posts), it took another 3 years to bring many of the changes introduced in Bill C-77 into force.  From 2019 to 2022 (when the provisions under Bill C-77 that bifurcated the Code of Service Discipline finally came into force), presiding officers repeatedly (and unlawfully) withheld the right to elect trial by court martial, and did so expressly on the (incorrect and unreasonable) advice of the Office of the JAG.

Once the Code of Service Discipline was bifurcated, the chain of command could lay charges for “service infractions” and would not be troubled by that pesky right to elect trial by court martial.  There were limitations, however.  Perhaps one of the most crucial limitations is that a summary hearing (which replaced the summary trial) must commence within 6 months of the alleged infraction.[3]

Over the past four years, I have noted that, despite now having a summary justice system that gives them “free reign”, the CF leadership still frequently demonstrates a lack of interest in using their disciplinary process in some circumstances.

There is one type of circumstance in which the reluctance to use the Code of Service Discipline is relatively easy to discern.  When the allegations are more than 6 months old, the chain of command cannot rely on “service infractions” to punish the subordinate.  And they are loath to rely on service offences.  After all, now service offences must be tried by courts martial.  And then the accused is permitted representation by counsel.  And we know that the chain of command isn’t keen on permitting counsel to represent an accused at a summary hearing.  That’s why they routinely (read: always) refuse to permit counsel to appear, or even attend, summary hearings.

Rory Fowler “Barriers to Legal Representation – Part III: The Outside Counsel Bogeyman”, (28 August 2024), online: Law Office of Rory G Fowler/Blog <https://roryfowlerlaw.com/barriers-to-legal-representation-part-iii-the-outside-counsel-bogeyman/>

Rory Fowler “Barriers to Legal Representation – Part IV: The Outside Counsel Bogeyman (cont.)” (13 September 2024), online: Law Office of Rory G Fowler/Blog <https://roryfowlerlaw.com/barriers-to-legal-representation-part-iv-the-outside-counsel-bogeyman-cont/>

 

But that is not the only circumstance.  Sometimes the evidence that is collected is clearly of dubious merit.  But, when the chain of command fears scrutiny or potentially negative news media coverage, “something must be done”.  And if evidence won’t withstand the weak scrutiny offered in a summary hearing, alternative processes must be sought.

So, the chain of command uses administrative measures as improper substitutes for disciplinary processes.  And, sometimes, the use (or abuse) of administrative processes for disciplinary purposes is comically obvious.  I have repeatedly encountered remedial measures under Defence Administrative Order and Directive (DAOD) 5019-4, Remedial Measures that were clearly being used as improper substitutes for Code of Service Discipline charges.  Why do I draw such conclusions?  Well, when the remedial measure is literally drafted like a charge, and the content of the remedial measure expressly references one or more service infractions under Chapter 120 of the Queen’s Regulations and Orders for the Canadian Forces (QR&O), that tends to signal the “command intent” rather clearly.

And when administrative actions (whether remedial measures or another form of administrative measures or actions) are predicated upon a unit disciplinary investigation or a military police investigation, that tends to “let the cat out of the bag”.  And all too often those investigations are not disclosed to the “accused” – at least, not in a meaningful manner.  Nor is the “accused” given a meaningful opportunity to test such evidence.  They are rarely, if ever, permitted to “confront their accuser(s)” – meaning, cross-examine any witness purporting to give evidence against them.

Instead, administrative action is taken in a perfunctory manner.

But, oh no, it isn’t intended to be disciplinary in nature.

And if you believe that, I have a bridge to sell you across the Great Cataraqui River.  It has a view of Royal Military College and Fort Frontenac.  It’s going cheap!

But let’s return to the CO and RSM of 3 PPCLI – or, perhaps more accurately, the soon-to-be-former CO and RSM.

Pursuant to the CDS’ Guidelines – Removal from Command (dated 12 December 2001, but still in force), and the Canadian Army Order (CAO) 11-94, Removal From Command (dated March 2015, but still in force), a truly temporary removal from command pending a disciplinary investigation could, potentially, be justified.  Based upon the circumstances described by the “rumour mill”, such a disciplinary investigation should only take a week or two.  Then a decision can be made whether charges will be laid.

Under CAO 11-94, “temporary” removal from command should last no more than a month (see para 19 of the CAO).  And, yes, I know – there have been several “temporary” removals from command that have lasted for several months, or even more than a year.  Silly rabbit – rules are for subordinates to follow.  And, again, let’s stick a pin in that, as that raises an issue that is directly related to the support for the corporal who shared the alleged photo that purportedly captured the alleged wrongdoing.

If no charges are laid, then the person(s) temporarily removed from command (or appointment) can be reinstated.  After all, if there is no justification to lay charges in relation to the incredibly loosely defined service infractions that are prosecuted before summary hearings, then there shouldn’t be a justification for maintaining the removal from command (or appointment).

If charges are merited, then the accused ought to benefit from a transparent and fair summary hearing, complete with adequate disclosure and an opportunity to make informed full answer and defence.  [Regrettably, I have encountered a number of summary hearings that I would be reluctant to describe as fair or reasonable.  But I have encountered them “from a distance”; whenever my clients have requested that I be permitted to attend and to represent them, the response has been, uniformly, negative.]

In this matter, it appears that the allegations are recent, so there ought to be no reason why there would not be jurisdiction to proceed with charges for service infractions (if warranted).

However, I have my doubts that any charges will be laid.  And that is because the notorious removal from command (and appointment) is being used primarily as a punitive measure.

You see, in my description of information gleaned from the rumour mill, I left out one crucial ‘fact’: purportedly, there was a change of command scheduled for 29 June 2026.  The CO 3 PPCLI was going to be replaced in less than a week.

But the senior leadership in the Canadian Army felt compelled not just to act, but to be seen to act.  That way, they could demonstrate that they have a grip on the situation.  So, they did what they often do: they punished the alleged misconduct using administrative action.  And they did so in a manner that was a little bit public and a little bit private, and a whole lot unfair and unreasonable.

A crucial factor to consider is that the Code of Service Discipline is expected to be public.  Summary hearings are held in public, unless there is a compelling reason (e.g., national security or sensitive information) to hold the hearing, or part thereof, in camera.  Charges and outcomes of summary hearings are expected to be notoriously published in discipline returns.  In contrast ‘administrative measures’ are typically protected personal information.

Where a person remains “temporarily” removed from command (or appointment) for several weeks or months, or if no charges are laid, such actions tend to be indicative of, and serve as object examples of, the use of administrative measures – which, by definition, are not intended to be public – as an improper substitute for discipline.  That would be an example of capricious and toxic leadership by the decision-makers involved.  And that tends to demonstrate precisely the problem that I described to the Senate Standing Committee on National Security, Defence and Veterans Affairs.

Furthermore, here’s something to consider: If a CF member, charged with, and prosecuted for, service infractions, seeks to challenge the outcome of the summary hearing (either the findings, the sanction(s), or both), the accused can seek review.  That tends to be conducted over the course of about 6 weeks.  The recourse, if the accused is not satisfied with the review, would be judicial review before the Federal Court.  See: Wiome v Canada (AG), 2025 FC 257.  Note that, unlike grievances, this review is not de novo review.  The scope by which a review authority can reverse-engineer the same outcome despite atrocious decision-making at first instance is limited.  Frankly, that is what Brigadier Graham tried to do in Wiome, and his attempt failed spectacularly.  And the judicial review will generally be conducted within a year of the initial summary hearing.

However, if the CF member is punished using ‘administrative measures’, it takes a lot longer.  [And, again, the CF decision-makers who misemploy administrative measures in this manner will invariably insist that it isn’t ‘punishment’, notwithstanding that any reasonable person can see it for what it is.]

First, the affected CF member must grieve it through the two-level CF grievance process.  While the initial authority has a limitation period (once the grievance is actually sent to the initial authority, which can sometimes take several months), the final authority does not have a limitation period.  Thus, some grievances can take five years or more to be determined by the final authority.  And some can take a lot longer.  Rumour has it that at least one grievance took 20 years to be determined.  And that grievance may be the subject of a current application for judicial review.  [And, yes, we will eventually explore that particular tale of intransigence, closed-minded decision-making, and rank incompetence.]

And the initial and final authority can try to reverse-engineer a ‘new’ justification for the same outcome through de novo review.  And they frequently do so.  And the affected CF member can only seek judicial review after the grievance process is exhausted.  And, typically, this is a deferential review.

“The House always wins” is an apt expression, particularly when the “House” makes all the rules and plays with loaded dice.

And don’t worry, I haven’t forgotten about the pins that we stuck on the board regarding the glee that select people have taken in this sad episode, or the issue of “Rules are for Corporals not for Colonels”.

[And, as an aside, when I first published that blog post, a few people took great umbrage with the title, including a couple of colonels.  Evidently the alliterative analogy was confusing for some.  The focus of that Blog post was not to defend corporals or to accuse colonels.  The sentiment was that, just as a subordinate is bound by rules, a higher-ranked decision-maker must also be bound by rules, or the system upon which such decision-making is based is vulnerable to being undermined.  And when rules bind only the subject of the decision, and not the decision-maker, injustice and impunity will almost always follow.  And, in some cases, the subject of the decision may be a colonel.  Or even a general.]

I have seen a few social media posts, possibly from current or former junior ranks, lauding the corporal who either took or disseminated the “incriminating” photograph(s).  Typically, this is accompanied by an expression of the sentiment that the CO and RSM were breaking the rules, figuring that they could “get away with it”, and were burned by their own hubris (or words to that effect).

I don’t know what, if any, rules were broken, or, indeed, what the CO and RSM may, or may not have done.  Presumably, that would be the subject of an investigation (if, indeed, an investigation is being conducted).

And I can see the attraction of gloating when a senior officer or a Chief Warrant Officer is “hoisted by their own petard”.  But I would suggest that this would be a misplaced sentiment, and it is not consistent with what I explained in my Blog post entitled “Rules are for Corporals, Not for Colonels”.

I also noted that the response to such gloating or lauding of the corporal who served as the catalyst for this incident was overwhelmingly critical of said corporal (and any persons lauding said corporal).  Descriptors such as “Blade” and “Blue Falcon” were used.  Well, “Blade” was used.  I have opted to use the term “Blue Falcon” instead of the term that was actually used.  And I am confident that most readers of this Blog know precisely what terms were used.

The interwebs can be a cruel place.

And I suspect those persons who used those descriptors ascertained the next point that I will discuss.  They may not have broken it down as I will do, but I suspect that they instinctively recognized the frailty in gloating over the CO’s and RSM’s misfortunes.

If you are revelling in their misfortune, which is very likely borne out of unreasonable, unfair, and even capriciously perfunctory decision-making, then you are inherently suggesting that this is an acceptable outcome.

And, again, it is understandable why some – particularly those characterized as “junior ranks” – may be tempted to adopt such a sentiment.  Many will have witnessed their peers being treated in an unfair or unreasonable manner by those holding superior rank.  Some may have been victims of unfair or unreasonable decision making.  But if you perceive that the ‘playing field’ is somehow levelled when those of higher rank are also subject to unfair and unreasonable decision-making, then you may be missing a key point that I repeatedly raise in these blogs: unfair and unreasonable decision-making is wrong.  It is adverse to the maintenance of discipline, efficiency, and morale in the CF.  It is a scourge of proper governance of the armed forces.

It is what our mothers used to tell us (and likely still do): “Two wrongs don’t make a right.”

The General Officers and Flag Officers (GOFO) who are making these decisions – and that includes people like Jennie Carignan and Mike Wright – appear to have forgotten very quickly that several of their peers were recently victims of precipitous unfair and unreasonable decision-making.  And it is a hollow rebuttal that “… it would never happen to me, because I conduct myself in a manner beyond reproach …”.  First: are you certain that your conduct is beyond reproach?  Second, anyone can be accused of anything, regardless of how virtuous their conduct.

If the CO and RSM of 3 PPCLI did, in fact, demonstrate misconduct, then the relevant decision-makers – the Commander 1^st Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group, the Commander 3^rd Cdn Div, and the CCA, have the necessary disciplinary tools available to them.

If those tools are not being used, and instead, administrative measures are again being used for a disciplinary purpose (as appears to be the case), then we all should be asking why.  We should be insisting on transparency.  We should be insisting on fairness.  And we should be insisting on reasonableness in decision-making.  We should be insisting that these principles should be followed for others, because we would insist that they be followed if we were the ones who stood accused of misconduct.

And the decision-makers involved in this process should be following these principles for the same reason.  They should be treating their subordinates the same way that they would wish to be treated.  Because rules, processes, and justice apply to all of us, or they apply to none of us.

To the CDS, the CCA, and the Commander 3^rd Cdn Div, I say this: do better.

Because what you have been doing thus far just doesn’t measure up.

Repeatedly, what we have witnessed is not justice.  It is not the proper application of discipline, or a disciplinary process.  It is theatre.  It is Kabuki Discipline.  And that just isn’t good enough for a professional armed forces.

I’m not angry about this.

But I am disappointed.

 

[Author’s Note: Some of you may be aware that, before I became a Legal Officer in the Canadian Forces, I was a Patricia.  I still am a Patricia (Once a Patricia …).  Some of you may conclude that this regimental affiliation influences what I have written here, or elsewhere.  I am not going to try to disabuse you of such notions.  I let my commentary and analysis speak for me.  But I would like to thank several of my brothers-in-arms who, through discussion and reflection, have prompted me to write the present Blog post.  They have also furnished information, thoughts, analysis, and even a few turns of phrase.  They know who they are, and I thank them for their contribution.]

 

[1] An Act to amend the National Defence Act and to make related and consequential amendments to other Acts, SC 2019, c 15 [Bill C-77].

[2] See, for example: Rory Fowler “Section 129 of the NDA is not the problem …” (10 March 2024), online: Law Office of Rory G Fowler/Blog <https://roryfowlerlaw.com/section-129-of-the-nda-is-not-the-problem/>.

[3] National Defence Act, RSC 1985, c N-5, s 165.4 [NDA].