DAOD 5019-1: Beware being sold a ‘bill of goods’

30 May 2026

A few days ago, a report on the CBC caught my attention.  I first heard the brief report on the radio, and subsequently found the online article entitled “Military to force disclosure of sexual, romantic relationships with a ‘power imbalance‘”.[1]

What caught my attention was that the news report made it sound like the policy described in Defence Administrative Order and Directive (DAOD) 5019-1, Personal Relationships, was a new and recent development, and one that responded to the “Report of the Independent External Comprehensive Review” (often colloquially referred to as the “Arbour Report”).[2]

Lieutenant-General Paul Prévost, the Chief Professional Conduct and Culture (CPCC), was quoted as stating that the change [in policy] aims to eliminate risk that comes from any “power differential or imbalance” between members engaging in a secret relationship.[3]

The CBC reported: “The new rule delivers on a recommendation made in a 2022 report by Louise Arbour, the next Governor General, who criticized ‘the persistence of sexual assault, abuse, harassment and discrimination’ in the military.”[4]

The problem is that this is not really a new policy, and the media speaking points that the Canadian Forces (CF) appears to be projecting seems like a disingenuous narrative.

DAOD 5019-1 has existed for over 20 years.  The previous iteration was called DAOD 5019-1, Fraternization and Personal Relationships.  It dealt with two, markedly distinct, issues.
“Fraternization” was often misconstrued or mischaracterized.  It was defined as:

“Any relationship between a CAF member and a person from an enemy or belligerent force, or a CAF member and a local inhabitant within a theatre of operations where CAF members are deployed.”

That definition did not apply to relationships formed between CF personnel.

That’s clearly not the focus of the amended policy.

The previous iteration of DAOD 5019-1 defined a personal relationship as:

“An emotional, romantic, sexual or family relationship, including marriage or a common-law partnership or civil union, between two CAF members, or a CAF member and a DND employee or contractor, or member of an allied force.”

That definition remains, unchanged, in the current form of the policy.

The CF introduced changes to this policy on 28 April 2026, including changing the name of the policy from “Fraternization and Personal Relationships” to “Personal Relationships”.  And I note that the CBC report appeared four weeks later, not a day or two after the policy was amended.  Coincidentally – or perhaps not-so-coincidentally – the CBC report appeared the same week that the current government pushed Bill C-11 through a Third Reading before the House of Commons, stripped of the amendments arising from Committee examination of the Bill, and then sent the Bill to the Senate.

Is it possible that the news release and coverage in “The Maple Leaf”, on 22 May 2026[5], could have been the catalyst for the CBC report 4 days later?

And, while the policy was certainly adjusted (including removing any policy direction regarding “fraternization” without indicating what replacement policy direction would be offered for that circumstance), there is a repeated suggestion that this policy is “new”.  And it clearly isn’t.

The CBC report goes on to state: “A former deputy minister at National Defence, Jody Thomas, called it a ‘really good start’ that will likely need to be refined with time.”[6]

That seems like an odd statement from someone who was the Deputy Minister at the peak of the ‘news media churn’ over sexual misconduct allegations pertaining to senior officers.

One might assume that, as Deputy Minister, she would have been aware that DAOD 5019-1 existed at that time (and for many years before) and that the contents of that policy addressed the issue of personal relationships.  The policy that existed at that time expressly required CF personnel to “… notify their chain of command of any personal relationship that could compromise the objectives of …” the policy.  Moreover, the policy at that time expressly defined “Adverse Personal Relationships”.

Heck, I wrote about this very policy in this Blog, five years ago, when Ms Thomas was the Deputy Minister:

Rory Fowler “Some Observations on Recent Developments in the Canadian Forces”, (3 March 2021) online: Law Office of Rory G Fowler/Blog < https://roryfowlerlaw.com/some-observations-on-recent-developments-in-the-canadian-forces/>

And, by virtue of being a notoriously published policy, it carried disciplinary consequences for an CF member who failed to comply with it.  Then, as now, section 129 of the National Defence Act[7] established (and establishes) an offence for acts, conduct, disorder or neglect to the prejudice of good order and discipline, including when a CF member fails to comply with statutes, regulations, and notoriously published orders and directives for the general information and guidance of the Canadian Forces or any part thereof,.

Arguably, the amendments introduced at the end of April 2026, further refined the policy – i.e., that would be the refinement that Ms Thomas suggested would come in the future.  And policies should be reviewed regularly in order to identify potential improvements or justifiable changes.  But the suggestion that DAOD 5019-1 is a “new” policy – and it is pretty clear that this is what is being suggested – is hokum.  It’s a policy adjustment masquerading as something more than it is.

As an aside, I note that it is difficult for the public to compare the ‘new’ policy with the previous version.  Unlike federal statutes (at least from the past 20 to 25 years) and many regulations, prior versions of DAOD are not readily available for comparison.  Members of the public can examine prior versions of the National Defence Act dating back to 2003 on the Department of Justice “Justice Laws Website”.  The same is not true for previous iterations of the DAOD.

What will be more interesting, is how this policy is enforced.  And, if matters proceed much as they have over the past several years, this won’t be enforced under the Code of Service Discipline.  At least, not consistently.  Instead, the chain of command will enforce it much as they have enforced many policies: through inconsistently applied and adjudicated administrative action.

And that was also something that I discussed in the above-mentioned blog from five years ago.

Unlike the Code of Service Discipline, many administrative processes, such as Administrative Reviews under DAOD 5019-2 and Remedial Measures under DAOD 5019-4, are ill-suited to examining disputed evidence.   They are fine for examining potential courses of action once evidence is tested, and facts are ascertained, using appropriate mechanisms, such as the Code of Service Discipline.  However, as I have observed, repeatedly, they fall far short when used to test disputed allegations.

After all, that is why the CF has a Code of Service Discipline, isn’t it?  To test allegations of misconduct.  So why does the chain of command repeatedly avoid using the Code of Service Discipline, even when allegations of misconduct are investigated by the military police or through a unit disciplinary investigation (UDI)?

And, in my experience, it seems that the chain of command is increasingly inclined to avoid the Code of Service Discipline, and employ administrative processes, when evidence has marginal merit.  They have also demonstrated this tendency if the allegations fall outside the limitation period for service infractions and summary hearings[8].  Instead of laying charges for service offences, the chain of command resorts to ‘administrative punishment’.

Sure, they will insist that it is not punishment.  The so-called administrative processes and measures are purportedly used for an “administrative purpose”.  They will cite passages such as para 4.16 of DAOD 5019-4, Remedial Measures, which states: “Administrative actions are not punishment or sanctions under the Code of Service Discipline.”

Strictly speaking, administrative action is distinct from the Code of Service Discipline.  But that doesn’t mean that the chain of command does not routinely rely on such courses of action as a (disingenuous) substitute for the Code of Service Discipline in order to punish a subordinate.

And, although it is true that, as indicated at para 4.18 of DAOD 5019-4, “[d]isciplinary actions and administrative actions serve different purposes”, it might be more apt to state that they should not be used interchangeably.  But that is precisely what the chain of command does when, following the completion of a disciplinary investigation, it opts to pursue “administrative action” instead of laying charges.  And, in so doing, the chain of command will employ mechanisms that are not designed to test or examine conflicting evidence and disputed allegations.

I have said this before, and I will say it again: the repeated use of administrative actions in lieu of the Code of Service Discipline is a cowardly approach to the maintenance of discipline in the CF.

Time will tell if this policy amendment is administered fairly and justly.  But one thing is certain, this is yet another example of exaggerated policy development designed to demonstrate that “something is being done”.

[1] Daniel Leblanc, “Military to force disclosure of sexual, romantic relationships with a ‘power imbalance’” (26 May 2026), online: CBC News <https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/canadian-military-relationship-disclosure-9.7211680> [Daniel Leblanc].

[2] The Honourable Louise Arbour “Report of the Independent External Comprehensive Review” (20 May 2022), online: Government of Canada <https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/corporate/reports-publications/report-of-the-independent-external-comprehensive-review.html>.

[3] Daniel Leblanc, n 3.

[4] Id.

[5] Government of Canada “Update to DAOD 5019-1: Clarifying definitions and disclosure requirements for personal relationships” (22 May 2026), online: The Maple Leaf <https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/maple-leaf/defence/2026/05/update-to-daod-5019-1-clarifying-definitions-and-disclosure-requirements-for-personal-relationships.html>.

[6] Daniel Leblanc, n 3.

[7] National Defence Act, RSC 1985, c N-5, s 129 [NDA].

[8] NDA, id, s 163.4.

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